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In relation to information, two issues are recurrent in the applied literature dealing with climate
change1. Firstly, the degree to which the emissions of greenhouse gases should be reduced today
will hinge on our assumption on the extent of our future knowledge about the climate. Secondly,
how much should we be ready to pay now through, for example, investment in scientic research,
in order to acquire information in the future?
The second of these questions relates to the value of information, or more explicitly the value
of an information structure2. It is a familiar concept in the economics of uncertainty, which has
been used for example in order to try and set an upper-bound to the value of a substantial research
program to reduce climate-related uncertainties (Manne and Richels, 1992).
As for the rst question, it is central to the theoretical literature on irreversibility and uncer-
tainty 3 and relates to the `irreversibility eect' (Henry, 1974a). This eect states roughly that,
when there is a source of irreversibility in the system we control, then the learning eect4 is pre-
cautionary. Most of the literature on the subject looks for conditions under which the eect holds.
In one of the seminal papers, Arrow and Fisher (1974), noted the \increasing concentration of
carbon dioxide in the global atmosphere" as an application for the reasoning. However, most of
the theoretical ndings, including theirs', can hardly be used to help and interpret the results of
integrated-assessment models (iam) of climate and economics such as dice (Nordhaus, 1994). In
eect, analytical models usually involve simplications that are extreme in regard to the climate
change issue. For instance, environment is always captured by a scalar variable that follows a lin-
ear dynamic, whereas in dice 98 (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) the environment is a ve-component
vector with a non-linear dynamic for the atmospheric temperature.
Moreover, as Ulph and Ulph (1997) noted, it is not possible to conclude in advance and \as a
matter of principle" about the direction of the learning eect for the climate change issue. This
would require the condition identied by Epstein (1980), which is not met even in the \simplest
model of global warming" that they set out. It implies that, in complex numerical models that
embed irreversibility sources, the direction of the learning eect may depend on the data. Moreover,
it may depend on the prior beliefs of the decision maker. This idea is reinforced by more recent
results by Gollier et al. (2000). In a two-period setting close to Ulph and Ulph's, they show that the
irreversibility eect is guaranteed for all risks if the utility function belongs to a restrictive class.
Concepts that can be used for interpreting (rather than conjecturing) the behaviour of complex
models were sought. We found promising to follow Ha-Duong (1998), who proposed to rely on
how, in the second-period problem, the value of information is modied by the initial decision. He
argues it should be a better guide than the notion of quasi-option value, which is traditional to
the irreversibility literature since introduced by Arrow and Fisher (1974). Moreover, results about
quasi-option value do not hold in the general case (Hanemann, 1989). Ha-Duong implements this
idea with a particular model: the initial decision is taken in a set of two elements (high or low
abatement), uncertainty is described by two states of nature (dangerous or benign). Once the
initial decision has been taken, he looks at the value of getting perfect information before the next
decision and points that this value of information depends on the initial decision; the irreversibility
eect takes place when the value of information, as a function of the initial decision, is greater for
1See for example Manne and Richels (1992); Nordhaus (1994).
2 We shall keep the terminology expected value of information for the case where the value of the information
structure is a random variable, see section 4.
3Arrow and Fisher (1974); Henry (1974a,b); Freixas and Laont (1984); Kolstad (1996); Ulph and Ulph (1997)
4By learning eect we refer to how the rst-period optimal decision is modied when the decision maker considers
that information will arrive in the future.
2high initial abatement than for low initial abatement.
Until recently, the irreversibility literature had not really taken advantage of the observation
that, once an initial decision is made, the value of information can be dened as a function of
that decision. Conrad (1980) emphasized the value of future information from the point of view of
the next generation but did not make this dependency explicit. Hanemann (1989) calls it value of
information conditional on the initial decision5, but even in the case where the set of admissible
decisions is a real interval, he considers this value only for some particular initial decisions (the
optimal decisions with and without information). More recently, however, Rouillon (2001) dened
for a particular model of climate-change the value of information as a function of the greenhouse
gases (ghg) concentration. He found in one of his cases that, when this value of information (after
the initial decision) is a monotone function of the pollution stock, then the optimal emission levels
with and without information can be ordered.
We show that this result is in fact very general and ties together dierent pieces of the literature
on uncertainty and irreversibility. It can also be applied properly in integrated assessment models
with few modications and thus connects two themes of the climate change literature, namely, the
value of information and the irreversibility eect.
Section 2 presents a standard model of sequential decision under uncertainty. Practically all
the specic models studied in the irreversibility literature from Arrow and Fisher to Gollier et
al. can be seen as particular instance of our model. Formally it is not restricted to environmental
problems. We dene the `subsequent' value of information as the value of the information structure
once the initial decision has been taken. In section 3, we show that, when value of information
is a (partially) monotone function of the initial decision, then the optimal initial decisions with
or without information can be compared. With two dierent information structures, the same
result applies to the value of exchanging one information structure for the other. The result does
not require any convexity conditions. It is extended in section 4 to sequential decision problems
including endogenous risk, active learning and stochastic dynamic. Section 5 shows how our result
unies and provides an interpretation for the conditions for the irreversibility eect that are given
in the literature. Finally, section 6 uses Nordhaus' dice model to provide a practical application.
2 The standard model of decision with learning
2.1 The decision problem
We consider in this section a rather general model of optimal control under uncertainty, where
decisions are taken at two periods of time, namely, at t = 0 and at t = 1. The decision maker aims





s.c. x1 = f(x0;u0) and ut 2 Ut(xt); t = 0;1:
xt 2 Rn is the state of the system at time t, which depends on the decisions ut through the dynamics
f; its initial value x0 is known; the decision ut must be chosen in a admissible set Ut  Rmt that,
in all generality, depends on t and on the state xt. We make the restriction that the initial decision
is a scalar (U0  R; i.e. m0 = 1). Finally lt() is the benet of decision ut when the system is in
the state xt. The function l1 depends on 
, a parameter unknown at time t = 0 that we represent
5We shall avoid this terminology, which can be confusing. See footnote 2.
3as a random variable over a probability space6 (
;F;P), where the ! 2 
 are the states of the
nature. Note that, at this stage, randomness appears only through 
, though the dynamics may
be taken as stochastic as we shall see in section 4.
We could actually write this standard model into a more compact form7 as it is the current
practice in the literature on irreversibility and decision under uncertainty. However, the explicit
distinction between state and control is convenient for handling the general model with stochastic
dynamics presented in section 4.
In what follows, we shall always assume that, for the problems we consider, the sup is attained
and we shall use the notation max.
2.2 Information structure
The decision maker eventually obtains information at time t = 1. A rather general way to describe
information is to assume the reception at time t = 1 of a signal8 that allows to improve on the law
P
 of the random variable 
 by conditioning: in this case,  is a random variable (over the same
sample space as 




 knowing . More generally, information is a -algebra (the one generated by the signal,
() in the case hereabove).
`No information' at time t = 1 can be represented by a constant signal over 
 or, equivalently,
by the trivial -algebra f
;;g. In the following, we shall denote by ? a non-informative structure.
At time t = 1, the decision maker receives a given realization (!) of the signal  before her
choice u1. For any state x1, the decision u1 can be seen as a function from 
 to U1(x1) and should
be measurable with respect to the -algebra induced by the signal function . We denote this
requirement by u1 4 :
u1 4  () (u1)  (): (2)
For the problem with information structure , dene the `expected optimal benet in state










which allows to rewrite the decision problem (1) at t = 0 as:
max
u02U0(x0)
[l0(u0) + V(f(x0;u0))]: (4)
6In the irreversibility literature 
 is a nite set of the possible values of 
, F = P(
), and P is the prior used by












8The irreversibility literature (for instance Freixas and Laont, 1984; Kolstad, 1996) relies on a description of
information through partitions. However partitions are less general in the non-nite case.
42.3 Subsequent value of the information structure
After any initial decision u0, the decision maker knows from the deterministic dynamics f what
subsequent state of the system, x1, will enter her new decision problem at time t = 1. If she
thinks she will not learn about 
 (information structure ?) , she may be ready to pay to obtain
information from a signal . When buying , she does not know which information she will receive,
but she will be able to move from the expected benet V?(x1) to the expected benet V(x1). Let
us dene therefore9
I(x)












as the subsequent value of the information structure  when the system will be in state x in t = 1.
This value is clearly always non-negative.
The denition makes clear that the value of the information is a function of the state of the
system. In applications (Manne and Richels, 1992; Nordhaus, 1994), the value of information is
usually dened before decision u0 has been taken ; therefore it can be considered to depend on x0.
In order to distinguish between these two notions, initial value of information will refer to the
usual denition, and subsequent value of information to denition by (5). In the following, we shall
indierently use the expressions `value of information' or `value of the information structure'.
More generally, when the state of the system in t = 1 is x1 = x, the value of having an
information structure 	 rather than the information structure  is:
	(x)
def = I	(x)   I(x) (6)
If 	 is ner10 than , this value is also positive.
3 Learning eect and value of information
3.1 How value of information enters the decision problem




[l0(u0) + V?(f(x0;u0))] (7)
From (4) and (7) and the denition of the subsequent value of information in (5), the initial
decision problem with information structure  writes:
max
u02U0(x0)
[l0(u0) + V?(f(x0;u0)) + I(f(x0;u0))] (8)
Comparing programs (7) and (8), it appears that the decision maker who expects information
optimizes the same objective as the uninformed decision maker plus the value of the information,
which depends on her initial decision. Her optimal decision can achieve a trade-o: it can be
suboptimal from the point of view of the non-informed decision maker but compensate for this by
an increase of the value of information.
9With general utility functions (instead of benet functions), the value of information is measured in utility units.
Equivalent or compensating variations in monetary values can also be dened (Laont, 1989).
10Meaning that the -algebra induced by  is included in the one induced by 	.
5Note also that I, the subsequent value of information, depends on the initial decision even
though there is no active learning, i.e. what one expects to learn does not depends on u0.
More generally, replacing the information structure  by the the information structure 	 leads
to a reformulation of the problem (4) as
max
u02U0(x0)
[l0(u0) + V(f(x0;u0)) + 	(f(x0;u0))]:
3.2 Comparison of initial and subsequent values of information
Before comparing rst period optimal decisions with and without future information, it is easier to
compare the subsequent values of information resulting from these decisions. The initial value of
information enters the comparison laid out in the following proposition (the proof is in Appendix 8).
Proposition 1
Denote by I0 the initial value of acquiring the information structure  before any decision u0 is
made:
I0 def = max
u02U0(x0)
[l0(u0) + V?(f(x0;u0)) + I(f(x0;u0))]   max
u02U0(x0)
[l0(u0) + V?(f(x0;u0))] : (9)
Let u?
0 be an optimal solution of (7), the problem without learning, and u
0 be an optimal solution
of (8), the problem with learning. Then,
I(f(x0;u?
0 ))  I0  I(f(x0;u
0 )): (10)
This comparison generalizes the relation between the initial value of information and the option
value given by Hanemann (1989), who denes option value as I(f(x0;u
0 ))   I(f(x0;u?
0 )) for a
family of problems where I(f(x0;u?
0 )) = 0.
The hereabove inequalities show that a decision maker who knows she will receive information
in the future chooses her rst decision so as to increase the value of information, whereas a decision
maker who neglects the fact that she will receive information makes a decision that reduces the
value she would be ready to pay for information.
We next derive sucient conditions for the comparison of initial optimal decisions, a problem
at the centre of the literature on irreversibility and uncertainty.
3.3 Comparison of optimal solutions; the learning eect
From Proposition 1, we obtain immediately:
8u > u?
0 ; I(f(x0;u)) < I(f(x0;u?
0 )) ) u
0  u?
0 :
Hence, a practical sucient condition for comparison of optimal solutions is to know that u0 7!
I(f(x0;u0)) is a strictly decreasing or a strictly increasing function11.
Definition 2
The eventual dierence between u
0 and u?
0 is the learning eect.
More generally we have the following, which is our main result.
11Note here that we adopt the following terminology: a function f dened on an ordered set is increasing if
x  y ) f(x)  f(y), and is strictly increasing if x > y ) f(x) > f(y); the same convention holds for decreasing
and strictly decreasing functions.
6Proposition 3
Let  and 	 be two information structures (not necessarily comparable in the sense that one is
ner than the other).
Let u
0 be any optimal initial decision with information structure , that is
u




0 be any optimal initial decision with information structure 	:
u	
0 2 arg max
u02U0(x0)
[l0(u0) + V	(f(x0;u0))]:




The result is immediate from (13) in Appendix12.
The results holds in fact under the weaker assumption that u0 7! 	(f(x0;u0)) is strictly
decreasing (respectively strictly increasing) when u0 < u	
0 (respectively when u0 > u	
0 .)
A more general proposition can be made for non-strictly decreasing (or increasing) functions.
Proposition 4
If the value of substituting 	 for , u0 7! 	(f(x0;u0)), is a decreasing function, then comparisons
are still possible under the form
suparg max
u02U0(x0)
[l0(u0) + V	(f(x0;u0))]  suparg max
u02U0(x0)
[l0(u0) + V(f(x0;u0))] :
The proof derives from Proposition 8, see appendix section 9.
As a consequence, if u




Before applications in Sections 5 and 6, the following denition relates the comparison of u
0
and u?
0 to the `irreversibility eect' and more generally to the `precautionary eect of the learning'.
Definition 5
Precautionary eect of learning
In the case where
1. l0 is an increasing function (i.e. increasing u0 yields benets in t = 0)
2. u0 7! l1(u1;f(x0;u0);
)) is a decreasing function (i.e. u0 implies some future costs)
then a decision u
0  u?
0 is said to be `more precautionary' than u?
0 and the learning eect from
 is said to be `precautionary'. This is also refered to as the `irreversibility eect'in some specic
cases.
12Freixas and Laont (1984) give sucient conditions for the monotonicity of 	 in a setting where the dynamics
is reduced to xt+1 = ut and where the state of the system does not enter the benets lt but only the admissibility
set. However, they do not provide the interpretation of  in terms of value of substituting information structures.
Kolstad (1996) obtains necessary and sucient conditions for a problem which is actually a sub-case of Freixas and
Laont though this does not appear at rst glance from his notations but has to be derived from his hypotheses.
74 Extension to active learning and stochastic evolution
Possible extensions of the standard case appear in the literature. This section shows that the main
result still apply in the general, extended case.
Stochastic dynamic. From period t = 0 on, the state of the system ~ xt is a random variable. Its
evolution may depend on an other random variable wt: ~ xt+1 = f(~ xt;ut;wt). The model in Conrad
(1980) is an occurrence of stochastic dynamic in the irreversibility literature.
Endogenous risk An example of endogenous risk can be found in Gjerde et al. (1999) where
the law of the date of a climate catastrophe depends on the emission reductions. Endogenous risk
arises when the random variable 
 depends on the previous decisions, u0 and u1. In stochastic
control theory, 
 is treated as a state variable. Endogenous risk is thus viewed as a particular case
of stochastic dynamic.
Active learning Active learning (or dependent learning) takes place when the initial decision
can modify the signal the decision maker will receive. It means that in addition to !,  depends on
u0, or more generally on ~ x1 (then the modication is also random). Rouillon (2001) studies a model
of active learning in climate change economics and uses the variations of the value of information
to conclude about the irreversibility eect.
Comparison in the general model
Consider the problem :
max
u0;u1
E[l0(u0; ~ x0) + l1(u1; ~ x1)]
s.c. ~ x1 = f(~ x0;u0;w0) and ut 2 Ut(yt);t = 0;1
where wt is a random variable (r.v.) and yt a non-stochastic subcomponent of ~ xt, so that the
decision maker knows the admissible set U(y1) when she makes her choice13 u1.
At time t = 1, when the state of the system is the r.v. ~ x, the information structure  delivers a
signal that depends on ~ x. We denote by ~ x the corresponding signal function ~ x : ! 7! s(!; ~ x(!)).
The decision-problem can be written as:
max
u02U0(y0)






l1(u1; ~ x) j ~ x

:
As in previous section, the decision problem with information can be put under the form:
max
u02U0(x0)
E[l0(u0; ~ x0) + V?(f(~ x0;u0;w0)) + I(f(~ x0;u0;w0))]
and the comparisons of initial decisions now rely on the expectation of I or 	 as follows.
13It is sucient to assume that the decision maker gets full information at time t = 1 on a stochastic subcomponent
~ y1; then this information, ~ y1 should be explicitly included for conditioning the problem, even in the case where no
additional information arrives.
8Proposition 6
If u0 7! E [	(f(~ x0;u0;w0))] is monotone, comparison of the optimal decisions for the general
problems with information structure  and 	 will be possible. Precise conditions are the same as
in Proposition 3.
It is self-explanatory that EI(f(~ x0;u0;w0)) is the expected value of information after decision
u0, and E	(f(~ x0;u0;w0)) the expected value of exchanging the information structure  for 	.
It is also possible to dene the value of information conditional on a realization of w0 or of ~ x1.
5 Value of information as a key to the irreversibility literature
A goal of the literature on irreversibility and uncertainty consists in identifying hypotheses or
conditions under which the `irreversibility eect' holds. Two kinds of conditions can be examined.
A rst thread follows Epstein (1980) and concentrates on determining the direction of the learning
eect for all possible random vectors 
 over a nite sample set and for all comparable information
structures. As Ulph and Ulph (1997) noted, this restricts the conclusion to limited classes of
problems, for example those later identied by Gollier et al. (2000). An other thread looks for
specic problems where the irreversibility eect is veried when Epstein conditions do not apply.
This for example the case in Ulph and Ulph (1997).
Though monotonicity of the value of information is only necessary for the irreversibility eect,
it turns out that Epstein necessary and sucient conditions imply a monotone value of information.
Besides, many of the specic (necessary) conditions found in the litterature also do. In particular,
we have already seen (section 3.2) that Proposition 1 generalizes Hanemann's statement on the
quasi-option value (Hanemann, 1989) and that Proposition 3 provides an interpretation for the
conditions examined by Freixas and Laont (1984) for a simple model (section 3.3). We shall
see it is also the case for many others, and moreover, this monotonicity is often intuitive without
fully-
edged mathematical demonstration.
5.1 Epstein's Theorem and the value of information
Epstein (1980) gave necessary and sucient conditions that allow to conclude about the direction
of the learning eect for all prior beliefs. We show that they also imply a monotone value of
information.
For any distribution law  on 












Epstein's Theorem states that initial decisions may be compared for any comparable information
structures (one being more informative than the other) when @J
@x(x;) exists and is convex or concave
in  varying among discrete probability laws.
We show that Epstein's assumptions, extended to non-discrete probability and without nec-
essarily dierentiability in the rst decision argument, are sucient conditions for the value of
information to be monotone and therefore to ensure the comparison of initial decisions.
Proposition 7
Assume that
1. for any u+  u , J(f(x0;u+);)   J(f(x0;u );) is convex (concave) in ,
92. 	 is ner than .
Then the value of substituting 	 for , u0 7! 	(f(x0;u0)), is an increasing (a decreasing)
function.
Thus, initial decisions may be compared (see the remarks following Proposition 3). The proof is in
appendix.
5.2 Linear dynamics and costs; `all or nothing' decision set
The seminal literature as well as more recent contributions often considers linear dynamics and
costs, which imply all or nothing decisions, or hinges directly on a binary decision set (see for
instance Arrow and Fisher, 1974; Henry, 1974a; Ha-Duong, 1998; Fisher, 2000 and Henry, 1974b,
part 2). With a binary decision set, the monotonicity of the value of information becomes trivial.
Moreover, the direction of variation is easily determined under the hypothesis of total irreversibility,
i.e. when one of the two possible initial decisions aects the state or the second period cost so that
it does not depend any longer on the second period decision. This is for example the case with the
model of Arrow and Fisher (1974).
5.3 Value of information in Ulph and Ulph, 1997




l0(u0) + E max
u14
[l1(u1)   E[
 j ]D(x1 + u1)]

(12)
with xt+1 = xt + ut and ut 2 [0;At];
where u are greenhouse gases (ghg) emissions, x ghg concentrations, lt utilities, and D a damage
function. At is the unrestricted level of emissions14. Functions lt are assumed to be strictly
increasing and strictly concave, and D strictly increasing and strictly convex. The r.v. 
 is assumed
to be non-negative.
The authors compare u?
0 , the initial decision without information, and u>
0 , the initial decision
with perfect information structure (for example  = 




1 ) is such that u?
1 = 0, then u>
0  u?
0 .
Two features are essential to this result. On the one hand, the assumption that the optimal policy,
u?
1 = 0, is a corner solution in second period. On the other hand, the shape of the the payo,
which is linear in the random variable.
We show (see Annex 11 for the proof) that, under their hypothesis and their condition u?
1 = 0,
the conclusion about the irreversibility eect can be generalized to any information structure 
because the second-period value of this information structure can be shown to be a decreasing
function for u0  u?
0 .
This generalized result can even been obtained intuitively, because, under their conditions,
monotonicity of the value of information becomes intuitive. Ulph and Ulph's condition implies that
when the ghg concentration in t = 1, x1, is above a certain level x0 + u?
0 , then it is optimal
14Ulph and Ulph do not make this hypothesis which is benign for the problem considered (greenhouse gases
emissions cannot be innite) and simplies the demonstration.
10to cut emissions to zero in t = 1 when no information is available. Therefore, if information is
obtained when we are in the situation x1, it might open the opportunity to emit. The value of
the information is then equal to the benet of additional emissions in t = 1 minus the expected
additional damages. From the envelope theorem, these expected additional damages are strictly
increasing at the margin for a small increase of the concentration x1, whereas benets do not depend
directly of the concentration level. As a consequence, the value of information diminishes and the
irreversibility eect applies.
6 Illustration with a modied stochastic version of dice
Here we produce a numerical illustration with a stochastic version of the standard integrated
assessment model dice 98 (Nordhaus et Boyer, 2000). Such a model is already complex compared
to the analytical ones present in the literature. But it will appear that, strikingly, the value of
information after initial policy choice behaves in a way that can support intuition.
The model is a stochastic optimal-growth model of the world economy. It is designed to max-
imize the discounted expected value of utility from consumption. The decisions variables are the
rate of investment and the rate of emissions reductions in greenhouse gases. The model operates
in time steps of 10 years. Perfect information about the uncertain climate parameter arrives in
2040. A simple adaptation of the original model ensures compatibility with the analytical frame-
work of section 4. We make a parameterization of the paths of investment and abatement from
now till 2030{2039 with a unique scalar. This scalar, the abatement rate targeted for 2030{2039,
summarizes and entirely denes the policy choice in the initial period.
6.1 The climate-economy system
The dynamic evolution of the climate-economy system can be represented with the relation: zi+1 =
g(zi;vi;
) where i 2 f0;1;:::;Tg is the 10-year interval spanning from year 2000 + 10i to year
2009+10i; vi 2 [0;1][0;1] is the couple of controls, which are the rate of reduction of greenhouse
gases and the investment rate in time step i; zi 2 R6 is the state of the climate-economy system
in the beginning of period i comprising the stock of capital; concentrations of carbon in three
reservoirs (atmosphere; biosphere and surface ocean; deep ocean); and oceanic and atmospheric
global mean temperature rises with respect to pre-industrial times.
The temperature components of z are stochastic. Uncertainty enters their dynamics through
the climate sensitivity 
. This random variable is equal to the atmospheric temperature rise for a
permanent doubling of the carbon concentration in the atmosphere. The r.v. 
 is constant through
time with values 2.5 C, 3.5 C and 4:5 C and remains unobserved until year 2040. In the rst step
i = 0, the true atmospheric temperature rise with respect to pre-industrial times is also uncertain.
The detailed climate-economy equations are slightly changed from the original version of dice.
The temperature increase equation is an updated calibration that provides a better description of
warming over forthcoming decades. A threshold damage function replaces the original quadratic
one. Both modications are taken from Ambrosi et al. (2003). The full description for the original
dice model can be found in Nordhaus (Nordhaus, 1994; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000).
6.2 The decision problem
At each time step i, a control vi and a state of the system zi result in a discounted random utility
Li(vi;zi). In fact we have two notions of time. The rst notion, the time steps, describes the natural
11time in the original problem. The second notion describes the decision periods. In accordance with
the framework of section 4, there are two decisions period t 2 f0;1g. The initial period, t = 0,
covers the time steps before learning, i = 0;:::;3; the next period, t = 1, covers the time steps
i = 4;:::;T. The decisions ut dene the controls vi as follows. The initial decision ut=0 2 [0;1] is
the level of abatement targeted for 2030; it parameterizes the investment and abatement path for
time steps i < 4 through a function ' from [0;1] into R6 : (vi)i2f0;:::;3g is taken equal to '(ut=0).
The next decision, ut=1 2 [0;1]2(T 3), is the vector of investment and abatement rates for i  4:
(vi)i2f4;:::;Tg = ut=1. Details for the parameterization of the initial policy are in Appendix 12.


















with (v0;:::;v3) = '(u0)
(v4;:::;vT) = u1 2 [0;1]2(T 3)
zi+1 = g(zi;vi;
)
where the path of controls before information is constrained to belong to the family of curves dened
by '. This decision problem clearly pertains15 to the framework described in section 4 but as far
we know it is out of bounds for the rest of the analytical literature about irreversibility, learning
and climate change.
6.3 How policy aects the value of information on the climate
The gure 1 page 13 plots the expected value of information as a function of the initial policy.
Available initial decisions range from no eort until 2030 (0% emissions reduction) to targeting
the maximum eort in 2030 (100% reduction). Three cases are presented corresponding to three
dierent probability distributions for 
: optimistic case, centered case and pessimistic case (see
Appendix 12).
In all cases, the expected value of information is strictly decreasing. Consistently, in all cases,
the prospect of learning the true value of 
 in 2040 is an opportunity to make initially less reduction
eorts (u>
0 ) than in the never-learn situation (u?
0 ). This is also consistent with the simulations made
by Ulph and Ulph (1997). If no certainty can ever16 be obtained about the future evolution of the
climate, the more cautious emission policy u?
0 would be preferred. Here, the learning eect is not
precautionary.
In an analytical framework with a linear dynamic, Gollier et al. (2000) showed that logarithmic
utility implies that the structure of information has no eect on the initial decision. They wondered
whether this was the explanation for the little or nonexistent learning eect found in earlier results
by Nordhaus (1994), Manne and Richels (1992) and others17. Our model departs from Nordhaus'
dice only with some specications of the dynamics (see section 6.1). But the utility function of
the model is logarithmic as it is in dice. However, the `learning eect' (the dierence between
u?
0 and u>
0 ) ranges from 9 to 21%. In terms of abatement costs this is even larger due to the
15With ~ x0 = (z0;
) and ~ x1 = (z4;
) so that
f(~ x0;u0;
) = [g (:::;(g(~ x0;v0;
);:::):::;v3;
);
]: Similarly l0 and l1 are dened through Li and compositions of g.
16Kelly and Kolstad (1999) suggest that certainty on the true value of the climate sensitivity with less than 5%
rejection might be available only after 2090.
17Ulph and Ulph used a quadratic specication for their numerical simulations and found that, for most parameter














































Figure 1: Variations of the expected value of information, EIs(u0), with u0.
In each case, the expected value of information has been normalized with EI0, the expected value
of information before any decision is made. Note that this normalization is dierent in each case.
13specication of the abatement costs in dice as a power function (with an exponent greater than
2). Clearly, learning has an eect on decision which is not negligible. Thus, our ndings answer
the question raised by Gollier et al. and show that the weak learning eect found by Nordhaus is
also determined by his choice of a particular dynamic and not solely by his logarithmic objective
function.
7 Conclusion
This article explored the role of the value of an information structure in analyzing general, se-
quential decision problems. The dierence between value of future information before and after an
initial decision is taken was made explicit. The monotonicity of the latter, the subsequent value of
information, is sucient for making a conclusion about the direction of the learning eect. Many of
the conditions given in the literature as sucient or as necessary and sucient for the irreversibil-
ity eect can be understood as guarantees for this monotonicity. The present analysis shares a
common limitation with the irreversibility literature: the initial decision is assumed to be scalar.
But extension is readily available in theory. As long as the set of admissible initial decisions can be
ordered even incompletely, Topkis' theorem (Topkis, 1978) leads to a similar conclusion. Extension
to multi-scalar decisions would help the interpretation of empirical integrated assessment models.
For example in the original dice model (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000), assuming that information
arrives in 2040, the initial decision vector has eight components (four abatement and investment
decisions). However, the diculty is to nd a meaningful order over the decision set.
For communication with policy-makers, there is a practical advantage in analyzing the learning
eect in terms of growing or strictly decreasing value of information because value of information is a
relatively self-explanatory concept (Ha-Duong, 1998). Finally, the intuitive simplicity of the notion
of value of information also suggests application in experimental economics. It should be possible
to design experimental tests of rationality under uncertainty that are based on how and whether
individuals modify their estimation of the value of improved future knowledge as a consequence of
their current decisions.
8 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
















0 is an optimal solution of the problem without information and since u
0 is an optimal
solution of the problem with information, we have, on the one hand,
J? = l0(u?
0 ) + V?(f(x0;u?
0 ))  l0(u





so that I   I?  I(f(x0;u
0 )).
14On the other hand,
I = l0(u
0 ) + V?(f(x0;u
0 ) + I(f(x0;u
0 ))  l0(u?






so that I   I?  I(f(x0;u?
0 )). Combining both inequalities, we obtain
I(f(x0;u?
0 ))  I0 = J   J?  I(f(x0;u
0 ))
which is Proposition 1.
Similarly we obtain easily:
	(f(x0;u




0 ) is any optimal initial decision for the problem with the information
structure 	 (respectively ). Note that, without specic hypothesis on the relative informativeness
of  and 	,  can assume negative values and J	   J can be negative.
9 Appendix: Comparison of arg max
We recall here results on comparison between the arg max of two optimization problems. They
may be seen as particular instances of results from a general theory with supermodular functions
or functions with increasing dierences as developed in Topkis (1998).
Proposition 8




g(u)  D and Dg+h
def = argmax
u2D
(g + h)(u)  D;
and we assume that Dg 6= ; and Dg+h 6= ;.
1. If h is strictly increasing on ]   1;supDg], then
supDg  inf Dg+h :
2. If h is increasing on ]   1;supDg], then
supDg  supDg+h :
3. If h is strictly decreasing on [inf Dg;+1[, then
supDg+h  inf Dg :
4. If h is decreasing on [inf Dg;+1[, then
inf Dg+h  inf Dg :
15Proof. We prove the rst statement, the others being minor variations.
Let u]
g 2 Dg. For any u 2 D, we have g(u)  g(u]
g). For any u 2]   1;u]
g[, we have h(u) < h(u]
g) if h is
strictly increasing. Thus
u 2]   1;u]
g[) g(u) + h(u) < g(u]
g) + h(u]
g):









This proves that supDg  inf Dg+h. 2
The proof of Proposition 3 is a straightforward consequence with u0 7! l0(u0)+V(f(x0;u0))+
	(f(x0;u0)) as function g and u0 7!  	(f(x0;u0)) as function h.
Freixas et Laont (1984) propose a similar proof for a case with simplied dynamics and criteria
(see section 3.3).
10 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 7
Let P(
) be the set of all distributions on 
, the states of the world. By classical arguments
(Breiman, 1993, p. 77) (as soon as 
 is a complete separable metric space for instance), there exists
a regular conditional probability of P given , denoted by P : 
  F ! [0;1] and characterized
by:
1. 8! 2 
, P(!;) 2 P(
);
2. 8A 2 F, ! ,! P(!;) is measurable with respect to ;
3. for all bounded random variable Z, E(Z j )(!) =
R

 Z(!0)P(!;d!0), for P-almost !.




def = Pf! 2 
; P(!;) 2 Mg: (14)
Equivalently, S is also the image of the measure P by the mapping
! 2 
 ,! P(!;) 2 P(
): (15)









































18A sensor is a probability law on the set P(
) of all distributions on the states of the world, i.e. an element of
P(P(
)), the Borel space of probability measures on P(
). Following Artstein (1999), an information structure can
be dened by a sensor since it governs which posterior beliefs will be materialized at the time of decision. Chapter ??
oers more recalls and developments on sensors. See especially section ?? page ??.
























Still following Artstein and Wets (1993) and Artstein (1999), we have that if 	 is ner than ,
then S	 is more rened than S in the sense that for all  : P(









Thus, under the assumptions, the value of substituting 	 for , u0 7! 	(f(x0;u0)), is an
increasing (a decreasing) function.











for the problem (12).








 D(u1 + x1)] :
Unicity of the arg max results from the strict concavity of the mapping u1 7! l1(u1) E
 D(u1+x1)




def = x0 + u?
0 , we have then u?
1 = ^ u1(x?
1 ) by denition. From Euler's charac-
terization of the maximum of a concave function, the assumption u?
1 = 0 implies that l0(0)  
E
D0(x?
1 )  0. Now, for any x1  x?
1 , we have
l0(0)   E
D0(x1)  l0(0)   E
D0(x?
1 )  0
since  D0 is decreasing (D is convex). Thus, by Euler's condition, ^ u1(x1) = 0. Replacing in V?(x1)









def = arg max
u14
l1(u1)   E[
 j ]D(u1 + x1)
which is a random variable.






 j ]D(u1 + x1) =  E[
 j ]D0(x1 + u
1 (x1)):



































 j ](D0(x1)   D0(x1 + u
1 (x1)))

which is non-positive since u
1 (x1;s)  0 and D is convex. Therefore u0 7! I(x0+u0) is decreasing
for all u0 greater than u?
0 : the value of information diminishes with initial ghg emissions above
their optimal level without information.
12 Appendix: Details for the numerical model
12.1 Summarized description of the modied dice model



















with zi+1 = g(zi;vi;
) (18)
The time horizon is T = 40. Time step i = 0 corresponds to the period 2000{2009. The date
of arrival of information, d, belongs to f0;:::;T + 1g.
Variables
Controls
vi ai GHG reduction rate
bi investment rate
State variables
zi Ki Capital stock
Mi 2 R3 Stocks of carbon in 3 reservoirs
i 2 R2 Mean temperature rises for atmosphere and ocean

 r.v. 2 fL;C;Hg Climate sensitivity
Intermediary, transfer variable
Y Available economic output
18Relations
Output Yi = Fi(Ki)(1   Ci(ai))(1   D(i)) (19)
Capital accumulation Ki+1 = G(Ki;biYi) (20)
Carbone cycle Mi+1 = H(ai;Ki;Mi) (21)
Reduced-form climate model i+1 = (i;Mi;
) (22)
Discounted utility Li(zi;vi) = Ui((1   bi)Yi)
Admissibility domain for bi bi 2 [0;1   "]
Admissibility domain for ai ai 2 [0;1] (Ci(1) < 1 for all i)
The dynamics summarized by function g in Eq. (18) is composed with the four relations (19{22).
Detailed functional forms can be found in Nordhaus (1994) or Nordhaus and Boyer (2000)
except for two modications from Ambrosi et al. (2003) | function  in Eq. (22) and damage
function D in Eq. (19) | that are reproduced in section 12.5 below.




Probability L(2.5 C) C(3.5 C) H(4.5 C)
optimistic 2/3 1/3 1/3
centered 1/3 2/3 1/3
pessimistic 1/3 1/3 2/3
12.2 Parameterization of the controls in time steps 0 to 3
The goal is to compute the value of information in 2040 (d = 4) as a function of a scalar policy
decision describing abatement and investment choices from 2000 to 2039. We chose the abatement
rate targeted for 2030 as the key policy decision. The problem is to chose a sensible parameteri-
zation of investment and abatement before and up to 2030 with this scalar. We propose one that
approximates for i 2 f0;:::;3g the optimal trajectories of the model under the dierent hypotheses
available on the climate sensitivity. Afterwards, the parameterization allows to describe a wider
range of trajectories, including non-optimal ones (bad policy choices) in a coherent and continuous
manner.
For calibration purposes, we have therefore computed the numerical optimal values for (vi)i2f0:::3g
in problem (17) under four dierent hypotheses :
 H1: no uncertainty (d = 0) and 
 = L
 H2: no uncertainty (d = 0) and 
 = C
 H3: no uncertainty (d = 0) and 
 = H
 H4: information in 2040 (d = 5). 
 2 fL;C;Hg, pessimistic probabilities (see above) are
used.
19Abatement rate in year Investment rate in year
2000 2010 2020 2030 2000 2010 2020 2030
Hypothesis a0 a1 a2 a3 b0 b1 b2 b3
H1 0.059 0.075 0.093 0.115 0.239 0.232 0.228 0.225
H2 0.092 0.123 0.163 0.215 0.239 0.231 0.227 0.224
H3 0.138 0.194 0.266 0.361 0.238 0.231 0.226 0.223
H4 0.121 0.168 0.230 0.310 0.238 0.231 0.226 0.224
Table 1: Optimal abatement and investment rates under H1{4
The GAMS code for solving numerically problem (17) is `dice response art.gms' provided in at-
tachement. See also section ??. The numerical model has actually i =  1 as rst time step
corresponding to 1990{1999, but abatement is xed to a 1 = 0. Investment is xed as well with
value b 1 = 0:250. We obtain the following results, displayed below in Table 1
The parameterization chosen, ' : u0 7! (ai;bi)i2f0:::3g, is dened by
ai = 'a
i(u) = u + ui + ui2





0 = 0:239 'b
1 = 0:231 'b
2 = 0:227 'b
3 = 0:224
Both parameterizations are chosen to approximate the optimal numerical solutions of problem (??)






















































Figure 2: Parameterization of policy before 2040
The left panel of gure 2 shows as dots the optimal abatement rates ai in time steps i = 0;:::;3
under hypotheses H1{4. The lines trace the corresponding parameterizations 'a where u0 assume
in turn the preceding values of a3 in hypotheses H1{4.
The right panel of Figure 2 displays the optimal investment rates bi for i = 0:::3 under
hypotheses H1{H4 and the parametrization 'b
i as a line. Note that it depends only of the time step
and not of u.
2012.3 Optimal initial policies with and without learning




















with zi+1 = g(zi;'i(u0);
) for i < d
and zi+1 = g(zi;vi;
) for i  d
This problem is solved with MINOS 5 using the GAMS code `u0opt dicersp.gms'.For each proba-
bility distribution, we obtain the following optimal values for u0 with information arrival in 2040 or
without arrival of information.We have computed the initial value of information, I0 (the dierence
between the optimal value of the objective with d = 0 and with d = 4)
Optimal abatement target in 2030 with and without learning
Information in 2040 Never learn Initial value of information
Probability distribution u
0 u
0 (in utility units)
Optimistic 0.196 0.248 462
Centered 0.236 0.283 284
Pessimistic 0.308 0.338 193
Table 2:
The values for u
0 and u
0 are reported into Figure 1 of the main paper.




















with zi+1 = g(zi;vi;
) for i  d
and the r.v. zd determined by z0, 
 and u0 through:
zi+1 = g(zi;'i(u0);
) for i < d
We screen [0;1] for values of u0. For each value of u0, the problems in Eq. 24 are solved with
MINOS 5 using the GAMS code `vlrinfo dicersp.gms'.
An extract of the results is given in the next table.
12.5 Detailed modications to the original dice model
These modications are taken and reproduced from Ambrosi et al. (2003)
Reduced-form climate model








21Value of information as a function of initial policy
Probability distribution
pessimistic centered optimistic
Initial policy Value of information
u0 (in utility units)
0.000 269 355 520
0.051 255 343 507
0.101 241 328 494
0.152 228 314 481
0.202 217 300 467
0.253 206 286 454
0.303 196 274 441
0.354 187 262 428
0.404 178 250 416
0.455 170 240 404
0.505 163 230 392
0.556 156 220 381
0.606 150 212 370
0.657 143 203 359
0.707 138 195 346
0.758 132 188 333
0.808 127 181 322
0.859 122 174 311
0.909 118 167 300
0.960 114 161 290
1.000 110 157 283
Table 3: Initial policy is the abatement targeted for 2030
where
 i = t(At
i ;Oc
i ) is the vector of global mean temperature rise ( C) with respect to pre-
industrial times for the atmosphere and the ocean.
 Fi(Mi) is the radiative forcing dened by
Fi(Mi) = F2X log(Matm
i =280)=log2
where Matm
i , subcomponent of Mi, is the co2 atmospheric concentration in time step i. MPI
is the co2 atmospheric concentration at pre-industrial times, set at 280 ppm. F2X is the
instantaneous radiative forcing for an atmospheric concentration of 2  MPI, set at 3.71
W.m 2.
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where b = 0:005 C 1 is the linear trend of the damage; d = 0:03 is the magnitude of the jump ;
e = 0:1 controls the steepness of the jump ; K = 1:3 C and Z = 2:7 C are the temperatures where
the non-linear transition begins and ends.
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